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[Extracts from an interview with commander Joaquin Villalobos of the Farabundo Marti National
Liberation Front (FMLN) appearing on Salvadoran television on Oct. 27 are summarized below.
(Basic data from 11/21/88 report by Regional Coordination for Economic and Social Research of
Central America and the Caribbean-CRIES, Managua)] Q.: Is the FMLN planning to launch a final
offensive in the near future? Villalobos: Insurrection is not a matter of will, but rather an outcome
of social conditions. The struggle [in El Salvador] is proceeding in this direction, to greater violence,
in the first place due to the seriousness of the economic crisis. Next, is the absence of a solution to
structural problems arising from a program that lacked an economic grounding. The Venezuelan
model was copied, but without oil, and minus a basic departure point which in the Salvadoran case
would have been a deep-seated transformation of the land tenure structure. Given these conditions,
the Salvadoran crisis today represents a greater potential for explosion and is more severe than
when the war began. In this regard there are objective conditions and reasons for struggle. These
conditions are not enough, since organizational means are also necessary. No one can say that
the Salvadoran people lack the capacity to organize for struggle...For many years the Salvadoran
people have developed numerous organizational resources which permit them to express and
struggle for their interests in all possible ways, from peaceful to radical military forms. Thus, there
are objective reasons and conditions to struggle, and the organizational means to do so exist. There
is also a tradition of struggle that has evolved during eight years of war that cannot be explained
apart from knowledge of the meaning of the FMLN's efforts, and its support from the masses. This
tradition is also the product of El Salvador experiencing great social unrest throughout this century.
Given its population density, El Salvador today is one of the most socially "convulsed" countries in
Central America. In addition to the tradition of struggle, the revolutionary forces are united. The
movement has a strong central axis with the ability to lead in the struggle for social change, and
which functions to attract a large proportion of the social groups who desire change. There are no
disputes among three, four or five organizations. There is only one political body that has a single
personality...It is a mature one, having shown its competence all these years and the capacity to
fight on all levels of the struggle for change. is not ours. It pertains to those who did not implement
structural change, to those who have sold the nation's sovereignty, to those who believed that
strengthening the army could contain social change. Thus, what we are doing is to assume the role
which obviously corresponds to us. It would be naive to say that at the moment basic conditions
for a change in the correlation of forces present themselves, we would ignore it. We have been
engaged in armed struggle and proposing necessary social change for many years. Now, conditions
for a generalized struggle... are emerging. When the moment arrives, we will place ourselves at
the forefront of this push for change. A broad-based opposition consciousness which exists in El
Salvador is proceeding to a great leap toward a consciousness of generalized rebellion. is not only
the result of organizing work. It is also the result of structural changes in which multiple factors are
at work: the debilitation of the government, the dissolution of the armed forces, the weakening of
foreign support, the actions of the FMLN, the activities of the people in their popular struggles. All
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these elements are converging toward a flash point... Q.: With respect to the [March 1989] elections,
would you expect Chavez Mena to ensure the continuity of Christian Democracy as president?
Villalobos: When [Jose Napoleon] Duarte assumed the presidency the "reform project" was still
afloat. Some say that Chavez Mena will be able to reactivate a project that is currently drowning
in its own failures, contradictions. If we compare the [two men and their situations], when Duarte
came to power Christian Democracy's image as a safety factor was fresh. Today this image no
longer exists... [Moreover], Chavez Mena lacks the charisma and the political influence enjoyed by
Duarte in 1984. He is not a strong figure, and did have a "strong model" behind him when he began
[campaigning and building alliances]. It is also not certain that Chavez Mena will win the elections.
The Reagan administration's problem begins with the recognition that the Christian Democrats
may not win in 1989. Washington then had to begin by transforming Chavez Mena into a candidate,
even at the price of dividing the party which was seen as necessary to begin reconstructing the
reform project... We ask ourselves what other reforms does Mr. Chavez Mena contemplate that
he could push forward with a National Assembly controlled by ARENA? What agenda could he
be realistically committed when seeking to establish pacts and understandings with sectors of the
oligarchy...? In what conceivable circumstances and under the terms of what kind of political game
could he preside over a resuscitation of the Christian Democrat reform project? When, if ever, could
he be able to accomplish what Duarte managed to do? Today the political weakness of the Christian
Democrats are greater, the social crisis has deepened, the popular movement and struggle are in
ascendancy, the war has been extended throughout the country, and the Salvadoran administration
vacillates... After eight years the necessity for a reevaluation of the situation has been recognized.
We do not foresee the possibility of the Christian Democrats being able to promote a recovery
of its reformist project. Q.: Are you aware that urban sabotage...is politically costly, and that the
population has described such acts as terrorism? Villalobos: It is not a cost issue, but rather one
of political and military strategy. Where is the proof, the evidence, behind statements that urban
sabotage...has been costly or counterproductive for us? We managed to obstruct the government's
economic program. Our economic sabotage actions were successful as part of a strategy. It has
proven that in El Salvador there are two powers to reckon with, and has heightened generalized
struggle which has reinforced awareness of this "duality of powers." The government's tactics were
similar in the case of land mines. The army at first tried to avoid them, but could not. Later, they
used specially trained dogs and then mine detectors. Then, the army launched a political campaign
against mines, accusing us of maiming civilians, violating human rights, and the like. They are now
using the same political tactics with respect to urban sabotage. The urban actions are not going to
stop only because the army has launched a political campaign against the same... Regarding the
mines, we presented an 18-point proposal offering to terminate use of land mines in exchange for
end of certain practices by the Army...We continue to push this concrete instance of our political
will...The Army rejected our proposal. They said they were not willing to join us [in humanizing the
war], they said it wasn't possible... Q.: After the meeting with [Costa Rican] President [Oscar] Arias
we heard commander Leonel Gonzalez say that a stalemate no longer exists between the FMLN and
the Armed Forces. Instead, he said, your military maneuvers have produced a shift in the correlation
of forces in favor of the insurgency. What are some objective indicators of this tendency mentioned
by Gonzalez? Villalobos: In present circumstances, the military sphere cannot be separated from
the political, nor from the socio-economic...[A]lready in 1986 we made the Army see the error
of their practice of comparing the FMLN with the Army in terms of the number of helicopters,
tanks, regular combatants, financial resources...The problem cannot be understood simply by
adding up the number of FMLN combatants...[I]t is the FMLN that possesses the "detonating
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capacity" in the current crisis. We have greater strength in bringing about that which is necessary
to transform this struggle into a revolution. guerrillas and permanent forces are found on every
hill in El Salvador...We are a major determinant in the process of social change in El Salvador. We
are not engaged in a strategy in which we have sought to win the war by building large numbers
of regular combatants or large quantities of war materiel to compare with those of the Army. To
do this, we would have had to compare or make our forces competitive with the US imperium,
which has been supplying the Army. We have never been tied to such...an approach. What are
then the indicators...of our success? The increase in urban guerrilla actions, without which activity
on other fronts would be weaker. The Army is unable to say that the soldiers have reconquered
Chalatenango, or Morazan, that they have removed the guerrillas from Chichontepec or from Tres
Calles. In the countryside...the movement is spreading, based on greater popular participation. In
combination with the people's awareness of the generalized failure of the government's reformist
project, the commitment to and enthusiasm for struggle are growing. To summarize, prospects on all
these fronts are advancing.

-- End --
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